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“I am interested in placing myself, and the viewer, in a 
contradictory empathetic space, because I think this is a very just 
place from which to view the world and try to untangle what we 
learn from our observations of it. The difficult but crucially 
important thing is to embrace the empathy, and the 
contradictions, while finding a way for them to fuel not immobility 
but a discussion about something new. Finding the new in 
answering the question “what is to be done.””  
 
- Eric Baudelaire, 2017 
 
 
 
 
 ​“It is often said that we can no longer have an addressee for our 
political demands. But that’s not true. We have each other. What 
we can no longer get from the state, the party, the union, the boss, 
we ask for from one another. And we provide.”  
 
-Brian Kuan Wood, 2017 
  
 
 
 
“I am myself persuaded that there is a superabundance of evidence 
showing that a refined appreciation of art does not lead to any 
discernible improvement in the morality of such appreciators. And 
yet there is a connection, as I see it, between the ability to fully 
appreciate narrative fiction and the ability to participate in the 
morality of life, precisely because the ability to imagine oneself to 
be someone else is a prerequisite for both. It does not follow that 
one’s moral participation will be improved, however, because the 
questions remain open, first, of what one reads, and then of what 
one will do once one has appreciated another person.”  
 
- Ted Cohen, 2008  
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2 
Introduction 
 
The world is growing impossibly unpredictable. Social structures collapse and re-emerge on an 
endless loop, into a future of state-sanctioned concentration of power in the hands of 
tech-companies. Threats of nuclear warfare are materializing. Environmental destruction is 
taking unimaginable shapes. It comes as no surprise, then, that appeals to empathy and 
compassion have risen to the absolute forefront of public discourses. In a state of constant crisis, 
where do we look for hope and solace?  
 
Grasping for anything that humans could still offer the planet, empathy is customarily called 
upon as some kind of balm supposed to soothe our anxieties and clear our view. Large resources 
of empathy, so the thinking goes, is our best hope of healing ripped-apart social fabrics and 
reconciling conflicts where interests clash. ​Indeed, it has been suggested that empathy has 
become no less than an “Euro-American political obsession” (Pedwell, 2014:ix). ​Speaking in 
Chicago on Martin Luther King Day, 21 January 2002, president Barack Obama suggested that 
the US was facing “an empathy shortage (...) more serious than the federal budget deficit.”
1
Obama spoke of compassion often, calling upon the nation to come together and see each other 
through times of upheaval and unrest. In keeping with the politics of hope that captured the 
imagination of the nation, Obama was often caught on camera smiling, laughing, giving 
someone a hug. All the while, during his first year in the White House, Obama allegedly ordered 
ten times more drone strikes than George W. Bush did during the whole of his presidency 
(Purkiss & Serle, 2017).  
 
In the West, established political systems are felt to fall further and further away from grace and 
dignity, let alone democracy. Allegedly representative politics are exposed as ever more fragile, 
principles of parliamentarism prove vulnerable to fraught logic, social welfare services are 
steadily being dismantled. People are looking elsewhere for support and guidance. For the 
purposes of this paper, I consider artistic production and cultural consumption as part and 
parcel of that ‘elsewhere’,  following the claim by Maria Walsh that cultural production in the 
global West has become “a ​site of transformation and hope in lieu of organised politics.” ​(2017).  
 
Communities formed around subcultures and other marginalized forms of life and artistic 
expression have long experimented at the periphery of established political life. It also appears 
that the commercial, contemporary art world is more than ever keen on presenting itself as a 
prime site for radical emancipation. In recent years, artistic projects dedicated to human 
understanding and dignity have been abundant in several established art nodes of the global 
West . It is particularly telling that the most recent edition of documenta, the world’s arguably 
2
1“Obama 2002 MLK speech: Full video”, ​YouTube​, uploaded by morgenr, 3 October 2012, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=CAbQvJrDVv0 
2 The 2001 international show ​Empathy - Beyond The Horizon ​was hosted by Pori Art Museum and Sydney’s 
ArtSpace respectively. Empathy served as the leitmotif for the 2017 edition of the international, artistically 
experimental donaufestival held annually in Austria. A year later, the prestigious Ghebaly Gallery in downtown Los 
Angeles staged a group show titled ​The Pain of Others, ​drawing on Susan Sontag’s influential essay on suffering. In 
London, visitors have the chance to experience the world’s first empathy museum launched in 2015.  
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weightiest contemporary art fair, stretched a limb across from Kassel to Greece, under the 
premises of “Learning From Athens”. documenta’14 was loudly criticized for what was seen as a 
hypocritical, neocolonialist spirit of its move to Athens, a European epicentre of transnational 
capital in crisis - nevertheless, it was the first time in its history that documenta held its opening 
outside of Germany. Its leitmotif of learning, however successfully implemented, suggests 
humbleness and surrendering authority to that which is imagined as operating at the peripheries 
of global capital.  
 
Looking out for friends, ‘learning’ from those who suffer hardship, finding each other in the 
midst of crisis - these are some of the ways in which the contemporary art world attempts to 
counter the alienation of financial and political globalization. Of course, the close tie between 
empathy and art has long been pointed out by professional art educators. It comes as no surprise 
that within ​my own department at Aalto University, empathy is repeatedly thrown around as a 
dignifying virtue of art education. Larger capacities of empathy is envisioned as one of its most 
weighty promise. But what is it exactly about visual art and aesthetic education that is thought to 
engage and cultivate empathy? ​How might works of art activate, cultivate or, better still, call into 
question our empathetic capacities? Above all, what ​is​ empathy and how does it work?  
 
I will turn to discourse analysis and phenomenological research strategies in order to work 
through these questions in reference to the work ​Ribbons ​(2014) by ​British artist and writer Ed 
Atkins. Atkins has explored intimacy in digitally mediated surroundings for several years. Often 
working with facial motion capturing technology and 3D-modelling, the artist produces 
audio-visual pieces hovering between the hyper-real and unapologetically fake. Based on my 
own experience of ​Ribbons,​ I will draw on scholarship in visual culture, photography and 
phenomenology to tease out three key strategies at work in ​Ribbons,​ all of which relate 
significantly, I argue, to the questions of empathy and aesthetics outlined above. For purposes of 
clarity, I will first review the concepts of empathy and spectatorship central to the study, 
proceeding then to a discussion of ​Ribbons.​ Hereafter, I will make three suggestions for how art 
educators might bring ​Ribbons​ into their classrooms, in dialogue with other works of art. 
Finally, I will loop back to Obama’s politics of hope and the work of Carolyn Pedwell in order to 
meditate on the emancipatory, transformative potential of empathy.  
 
 
2. Defining empathy  
 
Empathy has been investigated across the spectrums of academic and scientific inquiry. 
Depending on cultural context and agenda, empathy has been understood as political good, 
social glue, anti-racist and feminist strategy, survival instinct or else malevolent trap leading us 
into cruelty. In the past decades, empathy has become a concern also for neuroscientists. The 
identification of mirror neurons in the human brain at the turn of the 2oth century was 
celebrated as a long overdue discovery of the neurological basis for empathy (Jeffers, 2009:19). 
However, the contemporary understanding of empathy has its origins in 19th century German 
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scholarship on art, visual culture and aesthetics (Reynolds & Reason, 2011). Since they are 
commonly used interchangeably, in the following chapters I will tease out distinctions between 
empathy and sympathy. I will also propose a more specific understanding of empathy as it 
relates to visual experience and spectatorship.  
 
 
2.1 Etymological roots  
 
Empathy has its etymological roots in the Greek ​empatheia ​(em- ‘in’ + pathos ‘feeling’), which 
literally means​ passion​. The idea of being ‘in’ something (presumably containing, by default, a 
mode of being ‘out’ of something) discernible in the Greek origin also infuses the contemporary 
sense of the word, which relies on distinctly modern ideas of projection and intersubjectivity. 
The very first entry for “empathy” in the Merriam Webster  online dictionary (2018) reads: 
 
“1 :the action of understanding, being aware of, being sensitive to, and vicariously 
experiencing the feelings, thoughts, and experience of another of either the past or present 
without having the feelings, thoughts, and experience fully communicated in an objectively 
explicit manner; also: the capacity for this” 
 
Indeed, ​vicariously ​experiencing means experiencing by way of imagination, by way of 
projection, through another. The modern sense of the word as “projecting oneself into the object 
of contemplation” first emerged in the late 19th century in an essay on optics and aesthetics by 
the German philosopher Robert Vischer. Vischer drew an hitherto undescribed distinction 
between ​verstehen​ (understanding) and what he coined as ​Einfühlung,​ literally ‘feeling into’ the 
object of contemplation. As fellow German philosopher and popular university professor 
Theodor Lipps picked up on the concept, advancing it in his own work on art and aesthetic 
experience, ​Einfühlung​ gained traction also in other academic contexts. However, the concept of 
empathy has continued to be influential in matters pertaining to aesthetics, particularly in the 
field of movement, dance and choreography. (Reynolds & Reason, 2011:19).  
 
Empathy is commonly but mistakenly mixed up with its cousin, sympathy. While empathy is 
pegged on the idea of projection, the definition of sympathy emphasizes lived similarity and 
shared experience. Spanning eight entries in the Merriam Webster online dictionary, the first 
entry for ‘sympathy’ reads “an affinity, association, or relationship between persons or things 
wherein whatever affects one similarly affects the other”; and, in a later entry “the act or capacity 
of entering into or sharing the feelings of interests of another”.​ ​It appears that sympathy has less 
to do with efforts of imagination, but rather hinges on identification through sharing; already 
having something in common. Less a matter of perspective-taking, or “talent for metaphor” as 
philosopher Ted Cohen (2008) puts it, sympathy is a relation to, or with, something that is 
already known . 
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2.2 Empathetic spectatorship  
 
This paper considers empathy in relation to aesthetic experience, foregrounding visual 
perception: watching, being watched and the effects produced by these practices. In my 
discussion of Ed Atkins ​Ribbons​, I will rely primarily on the model of empathetic identification 
in looking proposed by David Benin and Lisa Cartwright in their article​ Shame, Empathy and 
Looking Practices: Lessons from a Disability Studies Classroom ​(2006)​.​ The article ​examines 
shame as a primary site for generating a politically sound disability politics extending beyond 
pure compassion and pity. Taking as their point of departure a past teaching situation in which 
students respond to Diane Arbus’ ​Masked Woman in a Wheelchair ​(1970), the authors elaborate 
the relationships between looking practices, shame and empathy. Their discussion draws on the 
writings of empirical psychologist Silvan Tomkins, who was particularly preoccupied with the 
structure and function of shame. Tomkins suggests shame to be intricately bound up the visual 
field and, through the visual field, with desire. Following Tomkins, Benin and Cartwright suggest 
that looking and being looked at is a social act rooted essentially in pleasure and enjoyment 
(2006:161).  
 
Meanwhile, the intertwining of pleasure and gazing has of course become a commonplace tenet 
in scholarship on visual culture, often summarized in the idea of voyeurism. As Alison Dean 
notes in her essay on intimacy in the photography of Nan Goldin and Rineke Dijkstra, voyeurism 
is often imagined at one end of a moral spectrum, empathy being its assumed opposite. Dean 
(2015:177) describes this allegedly clear-cut line between morally sanctioned and unsanctioned 
practices as “...an ethical debate that hangs over nearly every depiction of human bodies, 
particularly those of women.” . As scholars of visual culture, voyeurism does not go unnoticed by 
Benin and Cartwright. However, the point of the authors is that even so, voyeuristic practices 
cannot be fully understood unless the question of shame is worked through properly. Simply 
accusing someone of voyeurism will not help build a sustainable politics of visibility and, as the 
authors suggest, disability.  
 
Following Tomkins, Benin and Cartwright  (2006:164) suggest that shame is constituted in a 
rupture in the pleasurable circuit of looking: it is when this circuit is interrupted, interest 
reduced and the path to enjoyment blocked, that shame takes hold of us. Here, in this moment 
of obstruction, when we avert our gaze, is where the authors insert the core issue of 
identification:  
 
“What is blocked, we propose, is not pleasure per se, but ​the ability to identify​ in the strict sense. 
Shame is strongly linked to pity and compassion responses, we suggest, because the shame 
process circumvents identification with the body represented.” 
 
In the case considered by the authors, the body represented is of course the woman in Arbus’ 
photograph, posing in a wheelchair in front of a Pennsylvania mental institution, concealing her 
face with a child’s witch mask. When the students in Benin’s and Cartwright’s classroom look 
away at the sight of the photograph, an interruption takes place in the flow of gazes, the students 
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looking at each other looking at the woman in the image looking back at them. Elaborating on 
this moment of interruption, the authors go on to suggest that it is in fact ​empathy ​that is 
obstructed, it is the desire to empathetically identify that is blocked. Somewhat paradoxically, it 
is however also the case that when the spectator looks down in shame, directing the gaze 
inwards, reflecting on their feelings, it is precisely empathy they are working towards 
(​ibid:​162-165). Empathy is envisioned not​ as a thing possessed, something that can be cultivated 
and ‘had’ in an intimate, subjective sense. Rather, empathy is understood in a porous sense as 
essentially relational, something that is produced in circulation (Pedwell 2014:47-50). ​In this 
way then, Benin and Cartwright extend Tomkins theory of shame to propose their own model of 
empathetic identification, allowing for a poignant consideration of the photographic image:  
 
“(...) in empathy there is a force in that moment when, in thinking I know how the subject in the 
image feels, I do not need to know about that subject or identify with her. I do not imagine 
myself to ‘see from her position’. Rather, in empathy, my ‘knowledge’ comes from the force of 
the object (the image, the representation), and my reciprocal sense that I recognise the feeling I 
perceive in its expression. The photograph of a human subject moves me to imagine the feelings 
of the other but the feelings may not match feelings I understand myself to have.” (2006:165) 
 
The authors distinguish here between sympathetic mode and empathetic modes of identifying 
with a (human) body in an image. In a bond that is sympathetic, I, the spectator, imagine myself 
to​ feel and see as the other feels and sees.​ This is a mirroring relationship. What Benin and 
Cartwright describe above is instead a projective relationship in which I, the spectator, am 
moved, ​propelled by a force emanating from the image to project in myself the feelings of the 
other - I am being ​made to feel​ like the other. Empathy springs from this effort of imagination. 
In the empathetic mode of identification, my ‘knowledge’ is not dependent on identifying in 
myself the  feelings experienced by the other (​I feel how you feel​). Rather, the ‘source of 
knowledge’ in empathy lies within the beheld object itself: the image, the representation. The 
object draws the spectator into its realm (moral or otherwise) by an innate force.  
 
The force of the image envisioned in Benin and Cartwright could be likened to what Arnold, 
Martin and Greer​ ​(2014:334) call the “feeling tone” of an artwork . I understand these rather 
vague-sounding concepts as attempts at capturing something true about the agency of a work of 
art. To add to these, consider Rajchman’s reading of Gilles Deleuze pondering the pre-reflective, 
tingly coming-together of sensations that characterizes encounters with works of art:  
 
“The being of sensation is what can only be sensed, since there precisely pre-exists no categorical 
unity, no ​sensus communis​ for it. At once more material and less divisible than sense data, it 
requires a synthesis of another, non-categorical sort, found in artworks, for example.” 
(Rajchman 2001:9, quoted in Kozel 2007:21)  
 
Much of experience simply cannot be clothed in speech; neither collected nor measured in a 
quantitative sense. And that is precisely how aesthetic sensations may open up windows for 
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going over and beyond ourselves - in action, imagination or otherwise. In other words, it’s how 
aesthetics connects to the ethical realm. 
 
3. Empathy as aesthetics - Ed Atkins’ ​Ribbons  
 
Ribbons​ is a three-channel HD video work by the British artist Ed Atkins from 2014 . The work 3
consists of audio, text and images revolving around the avatar Dave. In the following chapters, I 
will contemplate ​my own experience of​ Ribbons​ in order to consider three aspects of the 
ambivalence surrounding Dave: his status as digital simulation, his performance of vulnerability 
and, finally, the eeriness produced by these features respectively.   
4
 
 
3.1 Watching​ ​Dave 
 
I experienced ​Ribbons​ in spring 2017 during a visit to Kiasma show ARS17, an impressive 
display of contemporary art engaging with the shift towards total digitalization of life. ​Ribbons​, 
which has been on view both on single and multiple screens, was rigged in Kiasma in the form of 
a single-channel installation in a white, dimmed room empty except for the big single screen in 
front of which I sat down on the floor. Atkins was a vaguely familiar name to me at the time. In 
my mind, I had compartmentalized his name as belonging to the young crowds putting out work 
that art writers like to call ‘post-internet art’. In the seamless execution of Atkin’s digitally 
produced environment, I recognized references to digital gaming worlds and immersive virtual 
reality environments. What was most striking to me about ​Ribbons​ however was how 
disoriented I felt about its male protagonist, Dave.  
 
Dave, “this sort of skinhead guy” as Atkins puts it, is a customized 3D avatar purchased off of the 
Internet. Indeed the first thing one notices about the avatar is his naked skin covered with a 
pattern of tattoos referencing some collective image of what a young, white trash male looks like. 
Here is Atkins explaining what it means to purchase an avatar off the web: 
 
“Technically, practically, it’s a 3-D model that I bought online and then customised. So when you 
get him it’s basically a zipped up folder of big image files that constitute his skin and a lot of data 
that tells you how he might move in response to the way that you animate him. “   
5
 
For ​Ribbons​, Atkins used facial capture technology and 3D-modeling to map recordings of 
himself moving, speaking, grunting and singing onto the purchased data, crafting Dave into 
something in-between image and live body. Atkins stages Dave in digitally produced milieus: 
bars, unidentified rooms sometimes only present in the shape of walls. These surroundings form 
3 ​Ed Atkins, ​Ribbons​, 2014, three-channel HD video, color, sound, 13 minutes 18 seconds. 
4 ARS17 Hello World! was on view in Museum of Contemporary Art Kiasma 31.03.2017- 14.01.2018. 
5 “ARS17 - Ed Atkins” ​YouTube,​ uploaded by Kiasma Museum, May 9 2017, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=F3vDyaZXx28 
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the backdrop against which Dave moves through a sequence of vignettes; singing, urinating, 
slouching over bar tables, talking directly to the camera, peeking through holes or pushing parts 
of his body through them. In between the scenes featuring Dave, Atkins works with text and 
sound that vaguely resemble the very familiar dramaturgy of video games, advertisement clips 
and promotion videos. There are references to an array of different narratives, but the work 
remains collage-like without an easily detectable master narrative.  
 
Watching ​Ribbons,​ I oscillated between irritation and pity; now thinking Dave absolutely 
obnoxious in his helplessness, now feeling sorry for this lost soul who clearly cannot help 
himself. I felt in turn agitated, indifferent, ashamed and concerned. Dave enacts an abstracted 
version of something the viewer might agree to think of as a person, yet the question of 
authenticity remains ambivalent. This ambivalence lies at the very core of the artwork, 
prompting questions about subjectivity and objectification and intimacy that help us understand 
how empathy enters the viewer’s experience of ​Ribbons​.  
 
3.2 Self as image 
 
As we have seen, empathy is commonly understood as an intersubjective relationship, forged 
through a projection of the experience of another into the self. Interestingly, the Merriam 
Webster online dictionary ​(2018)​ tells us that empathy also can be defined as ​“the imaginative 
projection of a subjective state into an object so that the object appears to be infused with it”. 
Empathy, then, is also the state in which subjectivity bleeds into inanimate objects in our 
surroundings, connecting us to them in an affective bond. Carolyn Pedwell has noted that, as 
psychotherapy and psychoanalysis emerged in 20th century Europe and North America, 
understandings of empathy indeed gravitated closer to the advancing idea of the individual, 
private psyche hidden from sight. Therefore, contemporary understandings of empathy are 
bound up with the idea of gaining access to another person’s inner life. In the intellectual climate 
of 19th century where the concept originates however, empathy was not understood to bear 
primarily on our experience of fellow humans, but inanimate objects as well (2014:6).  
 
Whether or not and to what extent it is possible for humans to feel empathy for an inanimate 
object is a major debate stretching across scientific and academic disciplines. A review of these 
debates clearly lies beyond the scope of this paper. I want to begin here, however, by putting the 
question in a slightly different way: what happens to our empathetic capacities in encounters 
with objectified representations of human subjects, such as photographs or other kinds of 
digitally simulated images? This is of course the very same question that Benin and Cartwright 
pose and begin to answer in their model of empathetic spectatorship, as outlined above. The core 
of their argument is that the inner force of the image elicits in the viewer a reciprocal sense of 
first perceiving, and recognizing the feeling expressed by the human subject depicted. This 
relationship with the image forms the beginning of empathetic affection in looking practices. Yet 
Benin and Cartwright consider photographs of human subjects exclusively. Seeing that, unlike a 
photograph of a person, Dave is a digital simulation originating almost wholly from within a 
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computer-mediated environment, is the model of Benin and Cartwright helpful in making sense 
of​ Ribbons​?  
 
First of all, it is important to note that a photograph re-produces reality in a way that, although it 
too is constructed, claims for itself some kind of truth-value, or authenticity. This is why ethical 
questions of objectification and representation have long been central to lens-based forms of 
image-making, above all else in the tradition of portrait photography. ​Pondering a series of 
photographs depicting young, naked mothers by the artist Rineke Dijkstra, Alison Dean writes:  
 
“Her young, naked, and vulnerable subjects are removed from the context of their personal lives; 
the portraits call attention to photographic mediation by offering their subjects, as images, to the 
viewer.” (2015:180)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image source: ​Thomson, Allese.​“​Ed Atkins  discusses Ribbons.”​artforum.​ 18 August 2014.   
<​www.artforum.com/interviews/ed-atkins-discusses-ribbons-47876>Accessed 9 April 2018. 
 
According to Dean then, part of what makes up Dijkstra's photographs is a significant absence of 
the intimate context of a human life. Dean seems to suggest that Dijkstra’s photographs do not 
in fact pretend to be able to convey personhood. There is something about the way the artist 
constructs her photographs, Dean proposes, that is perfectly in keeping with the idea of portrait 
photography while at once undermining that very idea, conveying instead a resistance to the 
desire for representation, truth and piercing insight that the camera lens harbours. In a gesture 
highlighting the referential nature of photographs, Dijkstra's portraits are alive, paradoxically, 
by way of absence. 
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Because he exists, materially, as pure digitally mediated image and sound, Dave is sheer 
representation: a summation of references to known contesting narratives and visual repertoires 
distilled into one single character. Unlike a photograph of a human subject, the avatar references 
no one in particular. Unlike a photograph of a human subject, the image of Dave is alive in a 
visceral sense: he talks, sings, moves, expresses desires and curiosity, he makes faces and laughs, 
he looks straight into the camera, urinates into his liquor glass and smokes cigarettes, he sheds 
tears. If the innate force of Rineke Dijkstra's portraits presides in absence, Atkins employs the 
opposite strategy of oversaturation, staging the avatar in an amplified performance of 
personhood that intentionally crosses the boundaries of subtlety. Dave addresses the viewer 
directly in speech, he makes pleas to the viewer with a tinge of desperation, he stares back, he 
knows someone is watching. To top it all off, in one of the vignettes Dave tenderly sings the lyrics 
to a well-known tune by Randy Newman: ​human kindness overflowing / and I think it’s going 
to rain today . Another crucial moment in the video is when Dave lays down his head on a bar 
6
table to rest. Suddenly, his head and face are deflated, like a balloon turning into a raggedy mass 
of loose skin. The performance of the avatar is humanlike,​ ​yet his appearance is blatantly fake. 
Because Atkins takes care to remind his viewer that Dave is no more than a temporarily 
animated shell, the avatar’s deeply human display of sensitivity is overshadowed by a sense of 
someone faking.  
 
The paradoxical result is this: the more Dave expresses himself, the more intimate he gets, the 
more alienating it all feels, the more insincere he appears. This is how Atkins manages to draw 
his viewer into what film director Eric Baudelaire (see Gritz, 2017) calls a “contradictory 
empathetic space”, in which the audience’s feelings and sense-making strategies are triggered 
and undermined at once. Returning to the model of empathetic spectatorship posited by Benin 
and Cartwright, in the case of ​Ribbons​, the work of empathy delegated to the viewer is not so 
much struggling to imagine the feeling expressed in the human subject of an image. Dave, the 
artificial shell, unapologetically communicates moods, emotions, thoughts. In fact, he 
communicates a little bit too much a little too well. Dave feels every bit alive when he really 
should not. This is what the viewer has to work with: accepting the contradiction, highlighted by 
the artist, between manifest artificiality and claims to authenticity.  
 
 
3.3 Vulnerability 
 
Understandings of empathy that rely primarily on theories of intersubjectivity risk overlooking 
emphatic dimensions that are more direct, or sensory in nature. Slipping into the skin of 
another, stepping into someone else’s shoes - these commonplace metaphors speak to the 
prominence of the body in everyday understandings of empathy. Among all scholarly disciplines, 
it is the phenomenological approach that most readily recognizes its powerful corporeal 
dimension. Phenomenological writings on empathy do not by any means dismiss the notion of 
subjectivity, but rather thinks it embedded in the experience of being alive in a body.  
6 Newman, Randy. “I Think It’s Going to Rain Today.” ​Randy Newman, ​Reprise Records, 1968.  
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 In a study of the affective sciences and theories of mind, Giovanna Colombetti outlines a 
phenomenological approach to subjectivity that departs from the idea of the essentially private 
mind. Access to others happens not through simulations or “pretend states”. Instead, 
emphasizing embodiment and living ‘through’ the body, phenomenologists propose something 
of a primordial response to others that is constituted in feeling and experience. Here, Colombetti 
draws on the writings of the early 20th century German phenomenologist Edith Stein to 
introduce a distinction between mere physical things (​Körper​) and lived bodies (​Leibe). ​Lived 
bodies, ​Leibe, ​are to be understood as “living centers or sources of subjectivity”. Phenomenology 
envisions empathy as a feeling in to, or tuning in to the other through the shared experience of 
inhabiting living bodies. Colombetti admits that there are instances in which empathy requires a 
resort to other forms of knowledge and imagination, but does not discuss this in further detail 
(2014:173-176). 
 
Colombetti exclusively considers live encounters between humans. Still, the distinction between 
mere ​Körper​ and ​Leibe ​is useful in trying to making sense of the premises on which the viewer 
encounters Dave. In accordance with the phenomenological line of thought, the body is the 
living seat of subjectivity. In Joan Copjec’s reading of Freud, the body is understood as the seat 
primarily of sex (2002:29). On an even more basic level though, if life is understood as a 
suspension of imminent death, the living body is first and foremost the seat of biological death. 
Accordingly, the shared experience of inhabiting live bodies as conceptualized by Edith Stein 
also entails a shared vulnerability over against an unpredictable, possibly lethal world. Tuning 
into another by way of empathy in the phenomenological sense, then, raises a crucial question of 
vulnerability in relation to the body.  
 
In light of these considerations, it would seem that Dave’s hyperreal appearance alone brings 
difficulties for the viewer to mobilize empathy. The techno genetic, digitally manipulated body of 
the avatar is an image oversaturated not in colour, but in glossiness. Dave’s muscular, 
light-skinned torso is at once intimidating and disarming. The camera zooms in and out on 
Dave’s face and body, revealing the pores of his skin and its small miscolourings. Yet in the cold 
light, the feeling of living flesh is lost in translation, a sensation of sleek plastic taking its place 
instead. The difference in textures is democratized such that Dave’s hand appears to be made up 
of more or less the same mass as the glass of whiskey it is holding. In fact, ​the glossiness of 
Ribbons ​resembles the appeal of the commodity in a window display, untouched and, most 
importantly, untouchable. ​Not only is the encounter with Dave mediated by a physical screen, 
but the materiality of the video conjures in itself the feeling of matted glass.  
 
Film theorist Laura Mark has postulated the helpful notions of mimetic spectatorship and 
‘haptic visuality’ to describe the experience of watching digitally mediated images on screen, 
moments in which “…the gaze roams or ‘grazes’ along the surface of the image or object. The 
emphasis here is on discerning texture, as opposed to depth or form.” (Mark 2000:163, quoted 
in Dean 2015:187). Watching, then, can be understood as touching in a physical sense. Because 
Ribbons​ offers close to no variation in texture, the viewer’s gaze glides smoothly back and forth 
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across the screen. Thus the viewer is allowed to contemplate the images, and Dave, as objects 
instead of being drawn into narrative. ​Surface becomes the fullest expression of reality, a 
condition which writer and visual artist Hannah Black skillfully captures in her essay on 
subjectivity and embodiment produced from within the alienation of neoliberal ideology. 
Introducing the “Hot Babe”, Black writes: 
 
“Let’s say the Hot Babe is the fully human being of the future, apparently lacking all interiority, 
super-connected, ultra-contemporary, without guilt or grief. (...) ​The Hot Babe is the 
embodiment of the flatness and emptiness of the image, but the very flatness and emptiness of 
the image, any image, is its uncanny fullness.” (2013)  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image sources: 
Left: <www.award.faber-castell.com/ed-atkins-drawings-videos-performances.html> Accessed 9 April 2018.  
Right: “Now Showing: Ed Atkins and Wael Shawky at Cestello Di Rivoli Museo Di Arte Contemporanea”​. Elephant Magazine​.  
4 November 2016 <www.elephant.art/now-showing-ed-atkins-wael-shawky-castello-di-rivoli-museo-di-arte-contemporanea/> 
Accessed 9 April 2018.  
 
Black’s Hot Babe is a feminine-coded form of existence, whose condition of being in the world is 
equal to the condition of existing purely as image, on screen. Dave fits this condition, too. Of 
course Dave really does exist strictly within the confines of the image, which suggests that Atkins 
is very much concerned with questions of authenticity and intimacy in contemporary life 
mediated by screens. Furthermore, Dave’s body is strictly coded as a generically white, buff 
heterosexual man with pale blue eyes and a shaved blond head. His demeanor is tough, liquor in 
his hand, cigarette butt hanging from his lips. This in turn suggests that Atkins is interested also 
in masculine forms of existence. 
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As I have argued in the previous chapter, the character of Dave is a ground for contesting 
narratives and popularized visual tropes to play out. Possibly the most prominent trope is that of 
a white, young, underdog male reaching out (to the viewer) in a state of sudden weakness or, 
given the abundance of poured whiskey, intoxication. The narrative is complicated by the story 
told by Dave’s skin. It is criss-crossed with something that look like DIY stick n poke tattoos. 
They cover his exposed torso, his hands and his forehead, all in black. White skin stretched tight 
over muscles, inscribed with sloppily designed self-made tattoos may trigger collective ideas of 
what, say, a petty criminal or prisoner looks like on a formal level. At the same time, Dave’s 
tattoos speak of desperation, isolation and a troubled sense of self. They read like small labels, 
some self-deprecating like “ASS HOLE”, “FML”; others read like reassuring mantras such as 
“DON’T DIE”, “HELP” and “XXX”. Once again, Alison Dean’s writing on the photography of 
Rineke Dijkstra proves helpful to think about the generous display of skin in ​Ribbons.​ Dean 
writes: 
 
“Skin functions as a border and a boundary; it is also porous and receptive. Skin also marks the 
subject, one way or another, in visual representations, providing external marks tracing one’s 
personal history (scars, wrinkles) and markers of one’s internal, genetic make-up…” (Dean 
2015:181) 
 
 
Image source:​ Nyberg, Patrik. “Kohtaamisia digimaailman ja tosimaailman rajapinnalla: Ed Atkinsin Ribbons”. ​Kiasma-blogi.​12 
May2017. <blog.kiasma.fi/blog/kohtaamisia-digimaailman-ja-tosimaailman-rajapinnalla-ed-atkinsin-ribbons/>  
Accessed 9 April 2018.  
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Showing skin is a very intimate form of exposure, which is ultimately ambivalent. It might speak 
of confidence, especially in the case of young well-trained males that look like Dave. In the case 
of Dave, showing skin covered in raw tattoos speaks rather to a longing for exposing the self in 
all its repulsiveness and naked weakness. If, as Dean suggests, the skin places the subject within 
a context of personal history, then the history told by Dave’s tattoos appears a violent one. At the 
same time however, it is tempting to banish the whole tattoo-thing as overdone, ridiculous even. 
I recall thinking the tattoos somehow too much, dismissing Dave as someone who indulges in 
their own show of helplessness. Yet again, the contradiction arises between authenticity and 
artificiality, leaving the viewer to wrestle with conflicting feelings. 
 
 
3.4 Eeriness 
 
I have argued that the fusion of computer-generated imagery and organic corporeality in the 
character of Dave creates conflicts that complicate the viewer’s readiness to empathize with him. 
These conflicts flow from a wavering sense of authenticity that is built into the very core of 
Atkin’s piece. In an astute observation for The Guardian, Adrian Searle writes of Dave: ​“You 
wouldn't approach this guy on the street. There is something worrying about the mobility of the 
mouth, those perfect teeth, the eyes that dart about as though through holes in a mask.” Searle 
touches upon what I have suggested to be the accentuated objecthood of the avatar which is very 
close to passing for what Sarah Whatley describes as a ​“fleshy, feeling, intentional and sensing 
entity” (2011:265). Alas, something about Dave is absolutely off.  
 
The field of robotics provides a helpful insight into this crooked resemblance that propels 
uncertain feelings and, as in Searle’s case, worry. Masahiro Mori, then robotics professor at the 
Tokyo Institute of Technology, first formulated what would be known as the Uncanny Valley 
hypothesis in an essay originally printed in the Japanese magazine ​Energy​ in 1970. Pondering 
contemporary efforts at creating an “artificial human”, Mori predicted that robots achieving an 
almost but not fully seamless likeness to humans will remain eerie. Mori proposed a 
hypothetical curve to describe the relationship between the degree of an object’s human 
resemblance and the affective responses of its audience. According to the curve, the (human) 
observer’s affinity increases in proportion to increasing (human) likeness (Mori concerned 
himself exclusively with mechanical devices, but the hypothesis was later also applied beyond 
the field robotics). Cases in which mechanical devices reach an ​almost​ complete human likeness 
fall within a sudden dip in Mori’s curve. It is this dip that Mori called the Uncanny Valley (2012). 
Mori’s article did not gain traction until in recent decades, as computer animation technologies 
have advanced rapidly. Scientists of the most varying disciplines have picked up the original 
hypothesis, reviewing it against themes in philosophy, psychology and popular culture. 
Researchers in psychology have been particularly interested in collecting empirical evidence in 
support of Mori’s proposal with continuously inconsistent results (Kätsyri, Förger, Mäkäräinen 
& Takala, 2015).  
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The concept of the uncanny emerged in 19th century Europe in the thought of Sigmund Freud. It 
has since been explored thoroughly in writings particularly on aesthetics. Literary and cultural 
theorist Nicholas Royle writes of the uncanny: 
 
“The uncanny involves feelings of uncertainty, in particular regarding the reality of who one is 
and what is being experienced. It is a crisis of the natural, touching upon everything that one 
might have thought was ‘part of nature’: one’s own nature, human nature, the nature of reality 
and the world. (...) More specifically, it is a peculiar comingling of the familiar and unfamiliar.” 
(2003:1)  
 
According to Royle then, uncanny experiences are of an existential character. The encounter 
with Dave on the screen is essentially uncanny in this sense. ​Ribbons ​is not a didactic piece, yet 
it brings out powerful tensions between embodiment and disembodiment, artificial and 
authentic, virtue and vice. Or rather, these supposedly opposing concepts are blurred into one 
another such that the viewer is asked to occupying many different perspectives all at once. In 
fact, as Sarah Whatley points out, the divide between the ‘virtual’ and ‘real’ is not to be 
understood as absolutely oppositional. In her text on kinesthetic empathy and virtual dancing 
bodies, Whatley wonders whether a virtual environment could not be experienced by the viewer 
as in fact sensual, physical and material as opposed to disembodied and abstract. Arriving at a 
discussion of interactive viewing environments, propelling the viewer to enter into an “attentive 
relationship” with the mover, Whatley asks: 
 
“In the live encounter, audiences may be more attuned to the dancer’s corporeality, potential 
vulnerability and even injure. So in a virtual environment, does the viewer attend to the virtual 
body differently? Do spectators continue to bring a reading of vulnerability to their encounter 
with the virtual dancer? Or might the nature of the interaction in the virtual environment mean 
that a condition of vulnerability is transferred to the viewer? Such is the blurring of the real and 
the virtual.” (2011:266-267)  
 
Whatley concludes that in comparison to live encounters, interacting with digitally produced 
bodies within immersive virtual environments might in fact hold the greatest promise for 
transformation. In the case of ​Ribbons,​ it is precisely the contradiction that harbours a potential 
for deep reflection. Really, the work of the viewer is overcoming alienation, reconciling the 
contradictory empathetic space produced in​ Ribbons. ​As I have argued, Atkins operates a 
double-move. The viewer is asked to suspend disbelief, allowing themselves to be moved by 
what’s happening on screen. When I project into myself the cluelessness and self-disdain 
performed by Dave, that’s an act of empathy. Yet I am is also asked to call into question that very 
act of giving in to the narratives on offer. It matters little, then, whether I think Dave is sincere, 
or in some way real. What matters is how I cope with the confusion.  
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4. Discussion  
 
In the previous chapters, I have argued that the ambivalence built into ​Ribbons ​originates in 
conflicting bonds of simultaneous affection and alienation between the viewer and the avatar 
Dave. I have also suggested that it is precisely in the ambivalence that empathy can begin to 
circulate in meaningful ways. I will elaborate this conclusion in the following chapters. Bringing 
Ribbons​ into a broader cultural framework, I first consider the piece in the light of contemporary 
discourses of intimacy and self-development. Secondly, I consider the implications of my 
findings for art educators, suggesting further paths of research into empathy, aesthetics and 
pedagogy.  
 
4.1 Digitally mediated intimacy  
 
Ribbons​ raises the question of authenticity on the level both of appearance and display of 
feeling. Atkins purposefully casts his protagonist in a shady light which draws the viewer into a 
state of undecidedness. When considered within a larger framework of social and cultural 
politics, it appears that​ Ribbons​ touches on something perfectly timely. In a world abounding 
with well-masked agendas and highly sophisticated tools of manipulation, can we trust images? 
Can we trust things that play out on screens? Do people mean what they say? ​I​n her essay on two 
contemporary moving image works, Maria Walsh (2017) discusses how the fusion of digital 
technology and neoliberalist capitalism has come to produce a swaying sense of truth and, in its 
wake, a desire for new forms of authenticity:  
 
“The performance of public acts of sincerity is key to this new kind of authenticity, which is 
desirous of personal, if not societal, change. (...) Transformation in this context is infused with 
popularised therapeutic discourses of self-development and recovery which are presented on 
reality television and online media support forums.” 
 
According to Walsh, the most beloved narratives of the present are those of personal relapse 
and recuperation in what Walsh calls “therapeutic makeover narratives”​ ​(2017). Echoing Walsh’s 
analysis, Lauren Berlant writes: “In modern discourse, therapy and confessional discourse have 
also ‘become internal to the modern, mass-mediated sense of intimacy’” (Berlant 2000:2, quoted 
in Dean 2015:179). Intimacy is imagined as the opposite of locating the self outside of social 
exchange, confidentiality is most intimate when publicly performed. Hannah Black’s essay 
springs to mind as she writes: “​What is private, secret, is not the detail of the life but the 
disappearance at its core.” (2013).  
  
In all his pitiful repulsiveness, Dave is clearly steeped in confessional discourse. Not only does 
Atkins write a story of insecurity and existential turbulence on the avatar’s skin, the artist also 
makes Dave articulate his troubles in a disinterested voice, asking the viewer for advice. Atkins 
drives the confessional gear up to a maximum and keeps Dave in limbo, on the verge of some 
imminent collapse. It remains unclear whether recovery is anywhere in sight, or what that would 
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even look like. Thus, while Atkins certainly concerns himself with the issues raised by Walsh, 
Berlant and Black alike, I understand ​Ribbons​ not so much as a critique. By critique I mean 
working in reference to an analysis rather than observations. Rather, ​objectification of the self 
through overexposure is built into ​Ribbons ​in an attempt to understand something new about 
the conditions of life in a visually oriented, neoliberal economy.​ ​Atkins complicates things 
further by wondering, through Dave, what it looks like when a buff white male attempts 
confidentiality, wearing his heart on his sleeve as it were?​ Mustering pity for Dave requires little 
effort. Empathy, as Benin and Cartwright have suggested, is a process that demands work, 
overcoming initial impulses and emotions. Atkins asks about the conditions on which that work 
can begin to take place, if at all.  
 
 
4.2 For the art educator  
 
I have argued that ​Ribbons​ is concerned with the politics of images, digital representation and 
empathy. These matters have informed my own studies in art education at Aalto University in a 
significant way since the very start. Tuning in to social and cultural shifts within visual culture, 
the field of art education is moving further away from honing technical skills, focusing instead 
on developing the student’s cognitive and analytical skills. Due to the digitalization of close to 
every aspect of life, media pedagogy and visual literacy has emerged as vital aspects of art 
education at large. These points of resonance between Atkins’ work and contemporary currents 
within art education makes ​Ribbons ​an excellent class-room case (although, because of the 
smoking, drinking and showing of genitals on screen, the work should be discussed with older 
students). ​Ribbons ​offers gateways into important discussions of the student’s own participation 
in image-economies such as social media or (online) gaming communities.  
 
With regards to social media, discussing ​Ribbons​ in light of Amalia Ulman’s online performance 
Excellences and Perfections​ (2014) appears a promising pedagogical move. Ulman used her own 
Instagram account to enact a carefully researched and scripted series of events, letting her 
online persona pass through a series of female stereotypes before revealing the trick to her 
followers. The piece reads as a comment on the work that goes into creating and curating an 
attractive online persona that still manages to pass for authentic​. ​The paradox is that creating an 
perfect surface, complete in its apparent effortlessness, requires hard work. And a great deal of 
money. The parallels to ​Ribbons ​are apparent in the themes of authenticity and intimacy. In 
Ulman’s work, they are both made transparent. When at the end of the performance, Ulman’s 
Instagram account goes dead, her followers are left in disbelief. The artist reflects back to her 
audience their own desires for looking at a certain type of (female) body doing certain things in 
certain settings. Is Ulman’s performance a form of digital manipulation? Is oversharing details 
of a life a form of digital manipulation? There are several points that connect here.  
 
As far as empathy is concerned, ​Ribbons ​could profitably be brought into dialogue also with 
Harun Farocki’s short film ​Inextinguishable Fire ​(1969) and Ai WeiWei’s “reenactment” of the 
dead Alan Kurdi in 2016. Farocki’s ​Inextinguishable Fire ​responds to the US invasion and 
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occupation of Vietnam in the mid-1960s, particularly focusing on the cruel napalm attacks on 
civilians. In the collective visual memory, the Vietnam War became synonymous with the 
mass-circulated photographs of burning children’s bodies. Farocki’s film is a collage, 
interspersing recordings of the artist performing for the camera with mass media footage. In the 
opening of​ ​the piece, Farocki burns his own skin with a cigarette butt, explaining to the viewer 
what napalm is capable of doing to a human body. The artist shows little to no signs of pain. The 
camera then jumps to an image of something of a bundled up body put on fire while a voice list 
facts about the heat at which napalm burns in comparison to a cigarette, how fast it burns, the 
poisonous gases it emits and how it behaves on human skin. It is devastating. By forcing the 
viewer to witness the burning of his own flesh, Farocki puts the viewer’s empathetic capacities to 
the test, daring us to imagine what napalm really is. It is didactical, very reasonable. However, 
Farocki does not seem interested in ushering empathy for himself. Rather, the artist worries that 
even if his audience comprehends, by way of imagination, how napalm works - do they care? In 
the opening shot of the film, Farocki recites: 
 
"How can we show you napalm in action? And how can we show you the injuries caused by 
napalm? If we show you pictures of napalm burns, you'll close your eyes. First you'll close your 
eyes to the pictures. Then you'll close your eyes to the memory. Then you'll close your eyes to the 
facts. Then you'll close your eyes to the entire context. If we show you a person with napalm 
burns, we will hurt your feelings. If we hurt your feelings, you’ll feel as if we’d tried napalm out 
on you, at your expense. We can give you only a hint of an idea of how napalm works."   
7
 
This monologue alone serves as an excellent prompt for exploring the politics of representation 
and engaged spectatorship together with students. Both Atkins and Farocki appeal to the 
vulnerability of bodies and minds, yet the artistic strategies employed lie at seemingly opposite 
sides of the spectrum. While Atkins explores digital 3D-modelling, Farocki works with his own 
live body. Both artists are concerned with mass-mediated images and visual catalogues but for 
seemingly different reasons. These appear to me fruitful points of departure for discussion in the 
classroom.  
 
Another interesting case to bring to the table is Ai WeiWei’s ‘reenactment’ of the photograph of 
Alan Kurdi, a drowned 3-year old Syrian boy washed up on a beach near the Turkish town of 
Bodrum. In September 2015, Kurdi and his family drowned in the Mediterranean sea during an 
attempted passage to the Greek island Kos.  The photograph of the small corpse became 
8
representative of the international failure to secure the lives of civilians escaping the grim 
violence of ISIS. In terms of visual culture, the phenomenon is thus reminiscent of the 
photographs of napalm victims in Vietnam fifty years ago. In the following year of 2016, Ai 
WeiWei, a Chinese-born artist and political activist, staged himself lying face down on the beach 
of the Greek island where he was working on projects related to the migration crisis. The deed 
was documented by photojournalist Rohit Chawla for ​India Today ​and the final black-and white 
7 “Inextinguishable Fire.” ​YouTube​, uploaded by my3rd3y3, 13 February 2012, 
www.youtube.com/watch?v=aJXJRNB-5kk 
8 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Alan_Kurdi 
19 
photograph was exhibited at India Art Fair in New Delhi. Not surprisingly, Weiwei brewed up a 
storm of accusations on social media, many renouncing the act a tasteless profiting off of the 
suffering of unknown others.  Meanwhile, is there a way to understand Weiwei’s deed as an act 
9
of empathy? Is reenactment an appropriate way of ‘putting yourself in the shoes of another’? 
Weiwei’s deed offers an excellent opportunity to reflect on the significance of context 
surrounding an image. It adds yet another approach to the ethical dimensions of visual 
representations of suffering explored by Farocki.  
 
There are many paths to go down and the possibilities for cross-reading and juxtaposition are 
boundless. However, these cases tell us little about the aspects of empathy supposedly inherent 
in making art and thinking about artistic processes together with others. While I have drawn 
primarily on philosophical and analytical discourses in visual culture, a practice-oriented study 
would require different research methods, engaging with the abundant empirical research on 
empathy that I have left out of this work.  
 
5. Prologue  
 
In​ Inextinguishable Fire​, Harun ​Farocki alerts the viewer to the ambivalent nature of empathy: 
even though we know, or in some way grasp the suffering of others through empathy, what does 
it matter unless we are ready to act upon those insights?​ ​Is it in other words true that the world 
needs more empathy, as Obama had it?  
 
In​ Affective Relations: The transnational politics of empathy, ​Carolyn Pedwell examines 
empathy in the context of transnational politics, relying primarily on texts by feminist and 
anti-racist thinkers. These discourses, previously marginalized, make visible the ambivalence of 
empathy as imbricated in complex relations of power. Several voices warn against treating 
empathy as the ultimate plaster that will stop the world from bleeding. There is a danger in 
glossing over difference in the longing for understanding and democratisation of feeling. Indeed, 
appeals to empathy might serve to uphold the very difference that we want to overcome, 
re-producing neo-colonialist narratives of ‘empathiser’ and ‘sufferer”.  
 
On the other hand however, in much of Pedwell’s source material, empathy is envisioned as a 
radically unsettling experience, its emotional charge more intense than in the cases of sympathy 
or compassion (although it is pointed out that all of these are in some way oriented towards 
care). Thus, empathy might allow for us to truly be affected by others, allowing us also to see our 
own complicity in hierarchies of power, how we are affected by and affect others. According to 
Pedwell, this is where the transformative potential of empathy lies (2014:47-50). The emphasis 
here is on action, going over and beyond oneself out of empathy:  
 
9 https://news.artnet.com/market/ai-weiwei-reenactment-drowned-syrian-toddler-417275 
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“... the suggestion is that, while ‘we’ might ​theorise ​social inequalities and commit ourselves to 
political responsibilities and obligations in the abstract, a transformation at the affective level is 
required to make ‘us’ actually feel, realise and act on them.“ (2014:47)  
 
Indeed, empathy is not in and of itself a commitment to reducing suffering and injustice in the 
world and should not be conflated with moral righteousness. An unusually empathic person is 
not automatically a morally just or kind person. Empathy loses all its transformative potential 
unless it is also underpinned by a vision of some kind of moral universe. If empathy with other 
beings is an initial yet insufficient impulse for transformation, perhaps what is called for is 
something as archaic-sounding as the courage to go over and beyond oneself - not unlike 
Antigone who, in burying her brother against the will of Creon, gave herself her own law. 
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